




U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536



File: LIN-99-257-50307 Office: Nebraska Service Center

Date: SEP 19 2000

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

Petition: Petition for Special Immigrant Religious Worker Pursuant to Section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4)

IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



Public Copy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

Identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Terrance M. O'Reilly
Terrance M. O'Reilly, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The immigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center. The matter is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a church. It seeks classification of the beneficiary as a special immigrant religious worker pursuant to section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4), to serve as an educational coordinator. The director denied the petition determining that the petitioner had failed to establish that the prospective occupation is a religious occupation.

On appeal, the petitioner argues that the beneficiary is eligible for the benefit sought.

Section 203(b)(4) of the Act provides classification to qualified special immigrant religious workers as described in section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(C), which pertains to an immigrant who:

(i) for at least 2 years immediately preceding the time of application for admission, has been a member of a religious denomination having a bona fide nonprofit, religious organization in the United States;

(ii) seeks to enter the United States--

(I) solely for the purpose of carrying on the vocation of a minister of that religious denomination,

(II) before October 1, 2000, in order to work for the organization at the request of the organization in a professional capacity in a religious vocation or occupation, or

(III) before October 1, 2000, in order to work for the organization (or for a bona fide organization which is affiliated with the religious denomination and is exempt from taxation as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Code of 1986) at the request of the organization in a religious vocation or occupation; and

(iii) has been carrying on such vocation, professional work, or other work continuously for at least the 2-year period described in clause (i).

At issue in the director's decision is whether the prospective occupation is a religious occupation.

8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(2) states, in pertinent part, that:

Religious occupation means an activity which relates to a traditional religious function. Examples of individuals in religious occupations include, but are not limited to, liturgical workers, religious instructors, religious counselors, cantors, catechists, workers in religious hospitals or religious health care facilities, missionaries, religious translators, or religious broadcasters. This group does not include janitors, maintenance workers, clerks, fund raisers, or persons solely involved in the solicitation of donations.

The regulation does not define the term "traditional religious function" and instead provides only a brief list of examples. The examples listed reflect that not all employees of a religious organization are considered to be engaged in a religious occupation. The regulation states that positions such as cantor, missionary, or religious instructor are examples of qualifying religious occupations. Persons in such positions must complete prescribed courses of training established by the governing body of the denomination and their services are directly related to the creed of the denomination. The regulation reflects that nonqualifying positions are those whose duties are primarily administrative, humanitarian, or secular. Persons in such positions must be qualified in their occupation, but they require no specific religious training or theological education.

The Service therefore interprets the term "traditional religious function" to require a demonstration that the duties of the position are directly related to the religious creed of the denomination, that specific prescribed religious training or theological education is required, that the position is defined and recognized by the governing body of the denomination, and that the position is traditionally a permanent, full-time, salaried occupation within the denomination.

In a letter submitted with the petition, the petitioner stated that:

On November 4, 1996, the Trustee Board employed [the beneficiary] as an Educational Coordinator in the Education Department. The Christian Education Department is a traditional organization that over sees various subcommittees that have been, and continues to be vital in evangelism and training of Liturgical Workers, Ministers and our children. The consensus was that [the beneficiary] was capable and committed to continue the success that is so evidence in this position.

On January 14, 2000, the director requested that the petitioner submit additional information. In response, the petitioner provided a list of duties assigned to the beneficiary. Among these duties were:

praise/worship leader; adult choral member . . . assist the Educational Director in supervision of staff/teachers . . . assist in paperwork, copying of lessons and plans for teachers . . . assist chairperson with junior activity clubs . . . assist in feeding of the Homeless on Wednesday Evenings.

On appeal, the petitioner states that the beneficiary's "position as a general support staff allows her to have an all-inclusive position in our Church." The description of the beneficiary's duties, provided by the petitioner, indicates that she is an active participant in many of the church's programs. This description further indicates, however, that many of the duties performed by the beneficiary (such as copying lesson plans and supervising staff) are administrative in nature. The performance of administrative duties in a religious environment is not equivalent to the performance of duties associated with a religious occupation. The petitioner has neither asserted nor documented that the beneficiary was required to undergo any religious training or theological education prior to qualifying for the position. Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary's prospective occupation is a religious occupation.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish the beneficiary's two years of continuous religious work experience as required at 8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(1) or that the beneficiary is qualified to work in a religious occupation as required at 8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(3). Also, the petitioner has failed to establish that it made a valid job offer to the beneficiary as required at 8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(4) or that it has the ability to pay a wage as required at 8 C.F.R. 204.5(g)(2). As the appeal will be dismissed on the ground discussed, these issues need not be examined further.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.