



U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536



FILE: [REDACTED]

Office: Texas Service Center

Date: NOV 2 2000

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under § 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



Identifying data...
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

Public Copy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Terrance M. O'Reilly, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of [REDACTED] who alleges that he was last present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole on April 27, 1990. Since he married his present wife in [REDACTED] in 1994, the April 27, 1990 date is incorrect. A Notice to Appear was issued in his behalf on March 27, 1998 and he was ordered removed from the United States on April 3, 1998. The applicant was removed on May 11, 1998; therefore, he is inadmissible under § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii).

The applicant was also found to be inadmissible to the United States under § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(as)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of committing a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant married a native of [REDACTED] in May 1994 in [REDACTED] who became a naturalized U.S. citizen in December 1995. The applicant seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under § 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii), to rejoin his family.

The director determined that the unfavorable factors outweighed the favorable ones and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant's wife and child have a constitutional right to family unification. The director has not explained why those rights are outweighed by a conviction for involuntary manslaughter.

There are no laws that require a United States citizen to leave the United States and live abroad. The uprooting of family and separation from friends represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994). In Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant's offense was not a crime involving moral turpitude, the act was not an intentional crime and the applicant did not present callous conduct. Counsel has failed to provide the Associate Commissioner with the appropriate Texas statute to support his argument.

It was held in Matter of Franklin, 20 I&N Dec. 867 (BIA 1994), that a conviction for involuntary manslaughter pursuant to §§ 562.016(4) and 565.024(1) of the Missouri Revised statutes constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude within that meaning in the Act where Missouri law requires that the convicted person must have consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and that such disregard constituted a gross deviation from the standard

of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.

The record reflects that the applicant was convicted on [REDACTED] of the charge of involuntary manslaughter committed on [REDACTED] and he was sentenced to four years probation. The State of Texas charged the applicant with unlawfully, recklessly causing the death of another person by pointing a firearm at that person and pulling the trigger causing the firearm to discharge and strike the person with a bullet causing his death. The charge for which the applicant was convicted appears to fit into the criteria set by the State of Missouri in classifying a violation as a crime involving moral turpitude.

Section 212(a)(9) ALIENS PREVIOUSLY REMOVED.-

(A) CERTAIN ALIENS PREVIOUSLY REMOVED.-

(ii) OTHER ALIENS.-Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under § 240 of the Act or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding,

and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) EXCEPTION.-Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

Section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act provides that aliens who have been otherwise ordered removed, ordered deported under former §§ 242 or 217 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252 or 1187, or ordered excluded under former § 236 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1226, and who have actually been removed (or departed after such an order) are inadmissible for 10 years.

Section 212(a)(6)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(B), was amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) and is now codified as § 212(a)(9)(A)(i) and (ii). According to the reasoning in Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996; A.G. 1997), the provisions of any legislation modifying the Act must normally be applied to waiver applications adjudicated on or after the enactment date of that legislation, unless other instructions are provided. IIRIRA became effective on September 30, 1996.

An appeal must be decided according to the law as it exists on the date it is before the appellate body. See Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 710-1 (1974). In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered. If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statute more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. Matter of George, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); Matter of Leveque, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

Prior to 1981, an alien who was arrested and deported from the United States was perpetually barred. In 1981 Congress amended former § 212(a)(17) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(17), eliminated the perpetual debarment and substituted a waiting period.

A review of the 1996 IIRIRA amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

The Service has held that an application for permission to reapply for admission to the United States may be approved when the applicant establishes he or she has equities within the United States or there are other favorable factors which offset the fact of deportation or removal at Government expense and any other adverse factors which may exist. Circumstances which are considered by the Service include, but are not limited to: the basis for removal; the recency of removal; the length of residence in the United States; the moral character of the applicant; the alien's respect for law and order; the evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; the existence of family responsibilities within the United States; any inadmissibility to the United States under other sections of the law; the hardship involved to the alien and to others; and the need for the applicant's services in the United States. Matter of Tin, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973). An approval in this proceeding requires the applicant to establish that the favorable aspects outweigh the unfavorable ones.

It is appropriate to examine the basis of a removal as well as an applicant's general compliance with immigration and other laws. Evidence of serious disregard for law is viewed as an adverse factor. Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978). Family ties in the United States are an important consideration in deciding whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. Matter of Acosta, 14 I&N Dec. 361 (D.D. 1973).

The favorable factors in this matter are the applicant's family ties, the approved preference visa petition, and the prospect of general hardship to the family.

The unfavorable factors in this matter include the applicant's unlawful entries, his criminal conviction and his lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in Matter of Lee, supra, that he could only relate a positive factor of residence in the United States where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law, would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

Matter of Barnes, 10 I&N Dec. 755 (Reg. Comm. 1964), held that an application for waiver of inadmissibility is denied in the exercise of discretion in the case of an alien who has been released on bond, probation, or parole, because such a court-ordered disability places an extraordinary burden upon the sentenced individual. The Regional Commissioner determined that it is not unreasonable to await the lifting of the restraint imposed by sentence before exercising any discretion in the alien's behalf. The applicant was placed on four years probation which expires on [REDACTED]

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. Although the decision in Matter of Barnes, related to an application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, the present application, as in Barnes, requires the discretion of the Attorney General and places an extraordinary burden upon the applicant. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

In discretionary matters, the applicant bears the full burden of proving eligibility in terms of equities in the United States which are not outweighed by adverse factors. See Matter of T-S-Y-, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957); Matter of Ducret, 15 I&N Dec. 620 (BIA 1976). After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish he warrants the favorable exercise of the Attorney General's discretion. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.