



U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
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
FILE: [Redacted] Office: San Francisco

Date: APR 19 2000

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under § 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(i)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



Public Law

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

Identifying and
prevent clearly and
invasion of personal privacy

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Terrance M. O'Reilly, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, San Francisco, California, and a subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Associate Commissioner for Examinations. The matter is before the Associate Commissioner on a motion to reopen. The motion will be granted and the order dismissing the appeal will be affirmed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of the Philippines who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured a visa and admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation in 1992. The applicant married a native of the Philippines and naturalized U.S. citizen in August 1996, and she is the beneficiary of an approved immediate relative visa petition. The applicant seeks the above waiver in order to remain in the United States and reside with her spouse.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly. The Associate Commissioner affirmed that decision on appeal.

On motion, counsel asserts that the applicant now has a U.S. citizen son and the removal of the applicant would impose extreme hardship on both her U.S. citizen spouse and U.S. citizen son. In § 212(i) proceedings, hardship to a child is no longer a consideration.

Counsel states that the applicant and her citizen spouse have made a significant investment in the purchase of a residence for \$246,000.00. Counsel states that a financial catastrophe will result if the applicant is removed.

Counsel states that in Matter of Lopez-Monzon, 17 I&N Dec. 280 (Comm. 1979), the Commissioner held that family unification is a central issue in the adjudication of § 212(i) cases. That decision was rendered before the IIRIRA amendments of 1996, prior to the U.S. Supreme decision in INS v Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26 (1996) which held that the Attorney General has the authority to consider any and all negative factors in a § 212(i) case and prior to the Board of Immigration Appeal's decision in Matter of Tijam, Interim Decision 3372 (BIA 1998) in which the Board declined to follow the policy set forth by the Commissioner in Matter of Alonso, 17 I&N Dec. 292 (Comm. 1979) and Matter of Da Silva, 17 I&N Dec. 288 (Comm 1979).

The record reflects that, after being denied nonimmigrant visas on several occasions, the applicant purchased a fraudulent Philippine passport in another name, and used that fraudulent document to obtain a nonimmigrant visa on May 15, 1992. The applicant was admitted to the United States using that fraudulent document on January 31, 1995, March 8, 1996, May 5, 1996, and August 15, 1996.

Section 212(a) CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.-Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

(6) ILLEGAL ENTRANTS AND IMMIGRATION VIOLATORS.-

(C) MISREPRESENTATION.-

(i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) ADMISSION OF IMMIGRANT INADMISSIBLE FOR FRAUD OR WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT.-

(1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. There is no longer any alternative provision for waiver of a § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) violation due to passage of time. In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered. See Matter of Soriano, Interim Decision 3289 (BIA, A.G. 1996).

If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statute more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. Matter of George and Lopez-Alvarez, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); Matter of Leveque, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

After reviewing the amendments to the Act and to other statutes regarding fraud and misrepresentation from 1957 to the present time, and after noting the increased penalties Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, and the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar, it is

concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from § 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for § 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. See Matter of Mendez, Interim Decision 3272 (BIA 1996).

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, Interim Decision 3380 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to § 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, the Board also held that the underlying fraud or misrepresentation may be considered as an adverse factor in adjudicating a § 212(i) waiver application in the exercise of discretion. Matter of Tijam, *supra*, followed. The Board declined to follow the policy set forth by the Commissioner in Matter of Alonso, *supra*, and Matter of Da Silva, *supra*, and noted that the United States Supreme Court ruled in INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, *supra*, that the Attorney General has the authority to consider any and all negative factors, including the respondent's initial fraud.

In Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.

The court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, the Board referred to a decision in Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), in which the court stated that "even assuming that the federal government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that the qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in the removal of a family member.

The grant or denial of the above waiver does not turn only on the issue of the meaning of "extreme hardship." It also hinges on the discretion of the Attorney General and pursuant to such terms, conditions, and procedures as she may by regulations prescribe.

It is noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity (referred to as an after-acquired family tie in Matter of Tijam, Interim Decision 3372 (BIA 1998), need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. The applicant in the present matter procured a nonimmigrant visa by fraud and used that document to procure admission into the United States on four separate occasions beginning in January 1993, as indicated on the waiver application and by an admission stamp in her passport. The applicant married her present spouse in the United States in August 1996. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity.

The favorable factors include the applicant's family ties, the absence of a criminal record and hardship to a qualifying relative.

The unfavorable factors include her procuring a nonimmigrant visa by fraud and her procuring admission into the United States on four occasions by fraud or willful misrepresentation.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. Her equity (marriage) gained after procuring a nonimmigrant visa and admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Matter of T-S-Y-, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the order dismissing the appeal will be affirmed.

ORDER: The order of September 30, 1999 dismissing the appeal is affirmed.