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U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

[redacted]

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

File: WAC 01 289 51041 Office: California Service Center Date: MAR 26 2003

IN RE: Petitioner: [redacted]
Beneficiary:

Petition: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

PUBLIC COPY

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:
This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Bureau) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of $110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a retail clothing store. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a manager. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by an individual labor certification approved by the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the financial ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date of the visa petition.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

> *Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

Eligibility in this matter hinges on the petitioner's ability to pay the wage offered as of the petition's priority date, which is the date the request for labor certification was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977). Here, the petition's priority date is January 12, 1998. The beneficiary's salary as stated on the labor certification is $22.64 per hour or $47,091.20 per annum.

Counsel submitted copies of the petitioner's 1998, 1999, and 2000 Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return including Schedule C,

Profit and Loss from Business Statement. The petitioner's 1998 Form 1040 reflected an adjusted gross income of -$184,626. Schedule C reflected gross receipts of $1,395,943; gross profit of $725,299; wages of $327,524; and a net profit of $26,845. The petitioner's 1999 Form 1040 reflected an adjusted gross income of $62,331. Schedule C reflected gross receipts of $1,148,818; gross profit of $723,446; wages of $311,514; and a net profit of $66,098.

The petitioner's 2000 Form 1040 reflected an adjusted gross income of -$153,031. Schedule C reflected gross receipts of $876,671; gross profit of $489,981; wages of $222,369; and a net profit of $47,582.

The director determined that the documentation was insufficient to establish that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage and denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the wages paid to the employer's manager of $40,000.00 could be used to pay the beneficiary's salary.

Counsel's assertion that the funds paid to a manager could be used to pay the beneficiary's salary is not persuasive. These funds were not retained by the petitioner for future use. Instead, these monies were expended on compensating the manager, and therefore, were not readily available for payment of the beneficiary's salary in 1998. Further, the petitioner has not documented the position, duties and termination of the manager who performed the duties of the proffered position. If he/she performed other kinds of work, then the beneficiary could not have replaced him/her as suggested by counsel.

Counsel further requests that the Service consider depreciation in establishing the petitioner's ability to pay the wage offered.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, the Service will examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well-established by both Service and judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, the court held the

Service had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. 623 F. Supp. at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, there is no precedent that would allow the petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. at 537; *see also Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. at 1054.

In an unincorporated association or sole proprietorship, the assets and income of the owner can be considered in determining the petitioning business' ability to pay the wage offered. In this case, however, the record does not contain any evidence of the petitioner's personal expenses nor does it show that the petitioner had other income or assets with which to pay the proffered wage.

The tax return for calendar year 1998 shows an adjusted gross income of -$184,626. The petitioner could not pay a salary of $47,091.20 a year out of this figure.

The petitioner must show that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date of the petition and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent resident status. See 8 C.F.R. 204.5(g)(2).

Accordingly, after a review of the federal tax returns, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had sufficient available funds to pay the salary offered as of the priority date of the petition and continuing to present.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.