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U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

[redacted]

Public Copy

File: WAC-98-177-51375 Office: California Service Center Date: AUG 1 2001

IN RE: Petitioner: [redacted]
Beneficiary:

Petition: Petition for Special Immigrant Religious Worker Pursuant to Section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act"), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4), as described at Section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(C)

IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: [redacted]

Identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

INSTRUCTIONS:
This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of $110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Myra L. Rosenberg

for Robert P. Wiemann, Acting Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The immigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a church. It seeks classification of the beneficiary as a special immigrant religious worker pursuant to section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act"), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4), in order to employ her as a "pianist" at a salary of $1,500 per month or $18,000 per year.

The director denied the petition finding that the claim that the beneficiary had been a volunteer pianist at two Presbyterian churches was insufficient to satisfy the requirement that the alien had been continuously carrying on a religious occupation for at least the two years preceding the filing of the petition.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner submitted a written brief.

Section 203(b)(4) of the Act provides classification to qualified special immigrant religious workers as described in section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(C), which pertains to an immigrant who:

> (i) for at least 2 years immediately preceding the time of application for admission, has been a member of a religious denomination having a bona fide nonprofit, religious organization in the United States;
>
> (ii) seeks to enter the United States--
>
> (I) solely for the purpose of carrying on the vocation of a minister of that religious denomination,
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> (II) before October 1, 2003, in order to work for the organization at the request of the organization in a professional capacity in a religious vocation or occupation, or
>
> (III) before October 1, 2003, in order to work for the organization (or for a bona fide organization which is affiliated with the religious denomination and is exempt from taxation as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Code of 1986) at the request of the organization in a religious vocation or occupation; and
>
> (iii) has been carrying on such vocation, professional work, or other work continuously for at least the 2-year period described in clause (i).

The petitioner in this matter is described as a church affiliated with the [redacted] Church USA denomination and that it

receives the appropriate tax exempt recognition as a member church. The petitioner claims a congregation of 200 members and annual revenues of approximately $215,000. The beneficiary is a native and citizen of Korea who was last admitted to the United States on April 29, 1997, in F-1 classification, and later received a change of classification to H-4 as the dependent of a temporary worker.

The first issue is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary had had the requisite two years of continuous experience in a religious occupation.

8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(1) states, in pertinent part, that:

> All three types of religious workers must have been performing the vocation, professional work, or other work continuously (either abroad or in the United States) for at least the two year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition.

The petition was filed on June 10, 1998. Therefore, the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary was continuously carrying on a religious occupation since at least June 10, 1996.

The petitioner submitted documentation stating that the beneficiary had played the piano for her church in Korea since January 1996 and has played for the petitioning church since entering the United States in April 1997. The beneficiary was not compensated by either church.

The director found that a claim of voluntary participation in church activities does not constitute carrying on a religious occupation for the purpose of special immigrant classification.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner argued, in part, that:

> In short, the beneficiary is being punished for being a charitable person in rejecting payment for her services at her churches. There is no requirement in the regulation that the employment during the two-year period must be a paid position. Furthermore, the beneficiary, while in the U.S., was in H-4 status and is therefore prohibited from receiving payment.

Counsel's argument and assertions are not persuasive. The pertinent regulations were drafted in recognition of the special circumstances of some religious workers, specifically those engaged in a religious vocation, in that they may not be salaried in the conventional sense and may not follow a conventional work schedule. The regulations distinguish religious vocations from lay religious occupations. 8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(2) defines a religious vocation, in part, as a calling to religious life evidenced by the taking of vows. While such persons are not employed *per se* in the conventional sense of salaried employment, they are fully

financially supported and maintained by their religious institution and are answerable to that institution. The regulation defines lay religious occupations, in contrast, in general terms as an activity related to a "traditional religious function." *Id.* Such lay persons are employed in the conventional sense of salaried employment. The regulations recognize this distinction by requiring that in order to qualify for special immigrant classification in a religious occupation, the job offer for a lay employee of a religious organization must show that he or she will be employed in the conventional sense of salaried employment and will not be dependent on supplemental employment. See 8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(4). Because the statute requires two years of continuous experience in the same position for which special immigrant classification is sought, the Service interprets its own regulations to require that, in cases of lay persons seeking to engage in a religious occupation, the prior experience must have been full-time salaried employment in order to qualify as well.

Voluntary participation in the activities of one's religious institution is not considered to be engagement in a religious occupation. The plain meaning of the term "occupation" is an individual's primary endeavor and means of financial support. In evaluating a claim of prior work experience, the Service must distinguish between common participation in the religious life of a denomination and engaging continuously in a religious occupation. It is traditional in many religious organizations for members to volunteer a great deal of their time serving on committees, visiting the sick, serving in the choir, teaching children's religion classes, and assisting the ordained ministry without being considered to be carrying on a religious occupation. It is not reasonable to assume that the petitioning religious organization, or any employer, could place the same responsibilities, the same control of time, and the same delegation of duties on an unpaid volunteer as it could on a salaried employee. For all these reasons, the Service holds that lay persons who perform volunteer activities for their church are not engaged in a religious occupation and that the voluntary activities do not constitute qualifying work experience for the purpose of an employment-based special immigrant visa petition.

Counsel's assertion regarding the alien being "punished" or the implication that she was subjected to unfair treatment is wholly without merit. It is noteworthy that the beneficiary could apply for nonimmigrant classification under section 101(a)(15)(R) of the Act, which does not require prior experience, to gain the stated benefit of employment authorization with the petitioning church if it can be established that the proposed position is a qualifying religious occupation. The petitioner bears the burden to establish that it is, in fact, making a bona fide offer of permanent employment to the alien. The petitioner's pursuit of a benefit that the beneficiary is clearly not eligible for raises a significant question as to the credibility of the claims made.

The petition is deficient on additional grounds.

8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(3) states, in pertinent part, that each petition for a religious worker must be accompanied by:

> (ii) A letter from an authorized official of the religious organization in the United States which (as applicable to the particular alien) establishes:
>
> (A) That, immediately prior to the filing of the petition, the alien has the required two years of membership in the denomination and the required two years of experience in the religious vocation, professional religious work, or other religious work.
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> * * *
>
> (D) That, if the alien is to work in another religious vocation or occupation, he or she is qualified in the religious vocation or occupation. Evidence of such qualifications may include, but need not be limited to, evidence establishing that the alien is a nun, monk, or religious brother, or that the type of work to be done relates to a traditional religious function.

8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(2) states, in pertinent part, that:

> *Religious vocation* means a calling to religious life evidenced by the demonstration of commitment practiced in the religious denomination, such as the taking of vows. Examples of individuals with a religious vocation include, but are not limited to, nuns, monks, and religious brothers and sisters.
>
> *Religious occupation* means an activity which relates to a traditional religious function. Examples of individuals in religious occupations include, but are not limited to, liturgical workers, religious instructors, religious counselors, cantors, catechists, workers in religious hospitals or religious health care facilities, missionaries, religious translators, or religious broadcasters. This group does not include janitors, maintenance workers, clerks, fund raisers, or persons solely involved in the solicitation of donations.

To establish eligibility for special immigrant classification, the petitioner must establish that the specific position that it is offering qualifies as a religious occupation as defined in these proceedings. The statute is silent on what constitutes a "religious occupation" and the regulation states only that it is an activity relating to a traditional religious function. The regulation does not define the term "traditional religious function" and instead provides a brief list of examples. The list

reveals that not all employees of a religious organization are considered to be engaged in a religious occupation for the purpose of special immigrant classification. The regulation states that positions such as cantor, missionary, or religious instructor are examples of qualifying religious occupations. Persons in such positions must complete prescribed courses of training established by the governing body of the denomination and their services are directly related to the creed and practice of the religion. The regulation reflects that nonqualifying positions are those whose duties are primarily administrative or secular in nature. Persons in such positions must be qualified in their occupation, but they require no specific religious training or theological education.

The Service therefore interprets the term "traditional religious function" to require a demonstration that the duties of the position are directly related to the religious creed of the denomination, that specific prescribed religious training or theological education is required, that the position is defined and recognized by the governing body of the denomination, and that the position is traditionally a permanent, full-time, salaried occupation within the denomination.

In this case, the proposed position is that of pianist at a small church. The petitioner asserted that it would be a full-time salaried position. On review, it must be concluded that the petitioner has failed to establish that the position qualifies as a religious occupation for the purpose of special immigrant classification.

First, the petitioner has not established how playing the piano for its worship services and related activities could reasonably reach a full-time level given the small size of the congregation. The petitioner provided no information regarding the number of services it holds or the time commitment it envisions for the position.

Second, playing piano is considered an essentially secular occupation, not a religious occupation. Music is a component of the worship services of many religious denominations. However, the performance of music for a religious organization is not considered a qualifying religious occupation for the purpose of special immigrant classification. A musical background, rather than a theological one, is the only prerequisite for the position. There is no inherent requirement that a person employed as a church pianist be a member of the employer's denomination or that he or she participate in the worship services, beyond providing the musical accompaniment. The duties of the position are not necessarily dependent on any religious background or prescribed theological education. Nor is the performance of the duty directly related to the creed of the denomination. Accordingly, it must be concluded that the petitioner has failed to establish that the position of piano player constitutes a qualifying religious occupation within the meaning of section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act.

Beyond the discussion in the director's decision, the petition is deficient on additional grounds. The petitioner failed to submit the required evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 204.5(g)(2) or that the beneficiary is qualified to perform a religious occupation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(3)(ii)(D). As the appeal will be dismissed on the grounds discussed, these issues need not be examined further.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.