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U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

PUBLIC COPY

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

[redacted]

File: [redacted] Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date:
(EAC 02 163 53419 relates)

FEB 28 2003

IN RE: Petitioner: [redacted]
Beneficiary:

Petition: Petition for Alien Fiance(e) Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(K)

IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED

Identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of $110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a naturalized citizen of the United States who seeks to classify the beneficiary, a native and citizen of Cuba, as the fiance(e) of a United States citizen pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(K).

The director denied the petition after determining that the petitioner and the beneficiary had not personally met within two years before the date of filing the petition, as required by section 214(d) of the Act. In reaching this conclusion, the director found that the petitioner's failure to comply with the statutory requirement was not the result of extreme hardship to the petitioner, or that compliance with the requirement would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or practice.

Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Act defines "fiance(e)" as:

> An alien who is the fiancee or fiance of a citizen of the United States and who seeks to enter the United States solely to conclude a valid marriage with the petitioner within ninety days after entry. . . .

Section 214(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1184(d), states in pertinent part that a fiance(e) petition:

> shall be approved only after satisfactory evidence is submitted by the petitioner to establish that the parties **have previously met in person within two years before the date of filing the petition**, have a bona fide intention to marry, and are legally able and actually willing to conclude a valid marriage in the United States within a period of ninety days after the alien's arrival. . . . [emphasis added]

The Petition for Alien Fiance(e) (Form I-129F) was filed with the Service on April 15, 2002. Therefore, the petitioner and the beneficiary were required to have met during the period that began on April 15, 2000 and ended on April 15, 2002.

With the initial filing of the petition, the petitioner indicated that he had met and seen the beneficiary. In response to the director's request for completed and signed Biographic Information sheets (Forms G-325) for the petitioner and beneficiary, as well as information concerning the date of the parties' last meeting, the petitioner submitted the completed and signed Forms G-325. He also submitted a copy of his passport page indicating that he had

travelled to Cuba, in transit through the Bahamas, on April 14, 1998 to meet the beneficiary.

On appeal, the petitioner submits a letter and documentation indicating that since his April 1998 visit, he twice requested (in September and December 2000) additional visas to visit Cuba but that both requests were rejected by Cuban authorities.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 214.2(k)(2), a director may exercise discretion and waive the requirement of a personal meeting between the two parties if it is established that compliance would:

(1) Result in extreme hardship to the petitioner; or

(2) Violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice.

The regulation at section 214.2(k)(2) does not define what may constitute extreme hardship to a petitioner. Therefore, each claim of extreme hardship must be judged on a case-by-case basis taking into account the totality of the petitioner's circumstances. Generally, a director looks at whether the petitioner can demonstrate the existence of circumstances that are (1) not within the power of the petitioner to control or change, and (2) likely to last for a considerable duration or the duration cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. Examples of such circumstances may include, but are not limited to, serious medical conditions or hazards to U.S. citizens to travel to certain countries.

The record does not contain sufficient documentary evidence to establish that the failure of the petitioner and the beneficiary to meet within the two-year period prior to filing the petition is the result of unique circumstances that are not within the power of the petitioner to change and are likely to last for a considerable duration. The petitioner has failed to submit any evidence that the beneficiary is precluded from obtaining, or has been refused, permission to exit Cuba in order to meet the petitioner.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.