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U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE

425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

[redacted]

File: [redacted] Office: MIAMI, FLORIDA Date: APR 25 2003

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

Application: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

PUBLIC COPY

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Bureau) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of $110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Miami, Florida, and is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Haiti who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having sought to procure admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to remain in the United States and adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident under the Haitian Refugee Immigrant Fairness Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277 (HRIFA).

The district director concluded that the applicant is ineligible for consideration of a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) because he failed to establish that he is the son or spouse of a lawful permanent resident or citizen of the United States. The district director denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief arguing that the application should be considered under the version of section 212(i) of the Act that existed at the time the applicant engaged in the fraudulent activity. Counsel states that establishing eligibility for a waiver under the then-existing provisions of section 212(i) of the Act would mean that the applicant would have been eligible for a waiver as the parent of a United States citizen child. Counsel cites *Landgraf v. USI Film Products*, 511 U.S. 244 (1994) and *Hughes Aircraft Company v. United States ex rel. Schumer*, 117 S. Ct. 1871 (1997) as holding that a clear expression of congressional intent is required to support the conclusion that INA section 212(i) mandates that an alien who is the father of a United States citizen, who allegedly committed fraud in 1993, should be precluded from applying for a waiver. Counsel asserts that absent such clear expression, the statute should be read to avoid the constitutional infirmities implicated by retroactive application.

The record reflects that the applicant sought to procure admission into the United States on December 6, 1993 by presenting a counterfeit nonimmigrant visa. On October 21, 1994, an immigration judge ordered the applicant excluded and deported from the United States.

Section 212(a) of the Act states:

> CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.- Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:
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> * * *

(6) ILLEGAL ENTRANTS AND IMMIGRATION VIOLATORS.-

* * *

(C) MISREPRESENTATION.-

(i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 902 of HRIFA provides that an applicant who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is ineligible for adjustment of status under HRIFA unless he or she receives a waiver of that ground of inadmissibility.

Section 212(i) of the Act states:

ADMISSION OF IMMIGRANT INADMISSIBLE FOR FRAUD OR WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT.-

(1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. There is no longer any alternative provision for waiver of a section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) violation due to passage of time. In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999).

If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statute more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. *Matter of George and Lopez-Alvarez*, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); *Matter of Leveque*, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for section 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

Nothing could be clearer than Congress' desire in recent years to limit, rather than extend, the relief available to aliens who have committed fraud or misrepresentation. Congress has almost unfettered power to decide which aliens may come to and remain in this country. This power has been recognized repeatedly by the Supreme Court. *See Fiallo v. Bell*, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); *Kleindienst v. Mandel*, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). *See also Matter of Yeung*, 21 I&N Dec. 610, 612 (BIA 1997).

The applicant has failed to establish that he has a qualifying relative (a spouse or parent who is a lawful permanent resident or citizen of the United States) who would experience extreme hardship if he is removed. Therefore, he is not statutorily eligible for the waiver requested. Because the applicant is ineligible for section 212(i) relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See Matter of T-S-Y-*, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.