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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

**PUBLIC COPY**

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE  
425 Eye Street N.W.  
BCIS, AAO, 20 Mass., 3/F  
Washington, D. C. 20536

[Redacted]

AUG 25 2003

FILE: [Redacted] Office: CHICAGO, ILLINOIS Date:

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[Redacted]

**Identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy**

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Bureau) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Chicago, Illinois, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who procured admission into the United States in 1996, by using a false Alien Registration Card (form I-551). The applicant is thus inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) for having procured admission through fraud or a willful material misrepresentation. The applicant is married to a naturalized U.S. citizen and he is the beneficiary of a petition for alien relative. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to remain in the United States with his wife and children.

The district director found the applicant had failed to establish that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if he were removed from the United States. The application was denied accordingly.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("Service", now known as the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services ("Bureau")) abused its discretion, and that establishing extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is not a statutory requirement for obtaining a waiver of inadmissibility. Counsel additionally asserts that the fact that the applicant has three United States (U.S.) citizen children should be accorded considerable weight in the adjudication of a waiver.

Counsel's assertions are unconvincing and contrary to current immigration law.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

(1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the

spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

In the present case, in order for the applicant to qualify for a section 212(i) waiver of inadmissibility, he must demonstrate extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse. It is noted that, contrary to counsel's assertions on appeal, Congress specifically did not include hardship to an alien's children as a factor to be considered in assessing extreme hardship under section 212(i) of the Act.

On appeal, counsel refers to several 1979 Board of Immigration Appeals cases to support his assertions. The cases referred to by counsel have either been overturned by court decisions or changes to immigration laws, or do not relate to a section 212(i) of the Act.

What is clear, is that section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, however, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See *Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (the BIA) provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

In this case, counsel asserted that the applicant's wife wants her family to stay together, that the applicant is the financial provider for the family and that it would be difficult for her to work and raise three children if she remained in the United States. No information or evidence

was provided to establish the extent to which the applicant's wife is dependent upon the applicant. Moreover, as noted by the district director, the evidence in the record reflects that the applicant's wife is originally from Mexico and thus, presumably has ties there. It is additionally noted that there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the applicant's wife is unable to work and support the family in the event that she chose not to accompany the applicant to Mexico, and no other evidence of hardship was submitted.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991). For example, *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *Hassan v. INS, supra*, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported.

The U.S. Supreme Court additionally held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality reflects that the applicant has failed to show that his U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he were removed from the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.