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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

[Redacted]

FILE: [Redacted] Office: San Francisco

Date: MAR 12 2003

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under
Section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: [Redacted]

PUBLIC COPY

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Bureau) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.


Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, San Francisco, California, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole as early as 1989. He was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant married a United States citizen in February 2001, and he is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative. The applicant seeks a waiver of this permanent bar to admission as provided under section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed upon his United States citizen wife. The district director also concluded that the unfavorable factors outweighed the favorable ones and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel states that the Bureau failed to apply the appropriate standards and failed to balance the severity of the offense against the favorable factors such as age of the offense, rehabilitation, long-term residence in the United States, favorable letters of support, and qualifying relatives.

Section 212(a)(2) of the Act states in pertinent part, that:

(A)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime,...is inadmissible.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in part, that:-The Secretary, Department of Homeland Security may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I),...or subsection (a)(2) and subparagraph (A)(i)(II) of such subsection insofar as it relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana if-

(1)(A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that-

(i)...the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,

(ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and

(iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien;...and

(2) the Secretary, in his discretion, and pursuant to such terms, conditions and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has consented to the alien's applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to the United States, or for adjustment of status....

The record reflects that following:

(1) The applicant was arrested on October 18, 1990. On March 29, 1991, the applicant was convicted of the offense of Petty Theft. He was sentenced to two days in jail and placed on probation for three years.

(2) The applicant was arrested on February 14, 1991. On March 29, 1991, he was convicted of the offense of Lewd Act on Person under 14 (three counts), and of the offense of Annoying/Molesting Child under 18. He was sentenced to 60 days in jail, placed on probation for 3 years and registered as a sex offender.

Here, fewer than 15 years have elapsed since the applicant committed the last violation. Therefore, the applicant is ineligible for the waiver provided by section 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act.

Nothing could be clearer than Congress' desire in recent years to limit, rather than extend, the relief available to aliens who have committed crimes involving moral turpitude. In addition to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, this intent was recently seen in the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, which relates to criminal aliens. Congress has almost unfettered power to decide which aliens may come to and remain in this country. This power has been recognized repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See *Fiallo v. Bell*, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); *Kleindienst v. Mandel*, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). See also *Matter of Yeung*, 21 I&N Dec. 610, 612 (BIA 1997).

Section 212(h) (1) (B) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from inadmissibility under section 212(a) (2) (A) (i) (I) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. The key term in the provision is "extreme." Therefore, only in cases of great actual or prospective injury to the qualifying relative(s) will the bar be removed. Common results of the bar, such as separation or financial difficulties, in themselves, are insufficient to warrant approval of an application unless combined with much more extreme impacts. *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245 (Comm. 1984). "Extreme hardship" to an alien himself cannot be considered in determining eligibility for a section 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility. *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968).

It is noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in *Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. The applicant in the present matter entered the United States unlawfully in 1989, was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude in 1991 rendering him inadmissible, remained unlawfully present from at least August 1993 and married his spouse in February 2001. He now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. However, as previously noted, a consideration of the Secretary's discretion is applicable only after extreme hardship has been established.

In *Matter of Goldeshtein*, 20 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 1991), *rev'd on other grounds*, 8 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 1993), the Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board) held that an application for discretionary relief, including a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, may be denied in the exercise of discretion without express rulings on the question of statutory eligibility. In that matter, the immigration judge found that there may be extreme hardship in that particular case but denied the waiver request as a matter of discretion because the applicant's offense was "very serious." See *INS v. Rios-Pineda*, 471 U.S. 444, 449 (1985); *INS v. Bagamasbad*, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976).

The applicant's convictions relating to Lewd Act on a Person, Annoying/Molesting Child under 18, and having to register as a sex offender in this matter are considered to be very serious. He does not warrant a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of establishing that the application merits approval remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.