U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Public Copy

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
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Washington, D.C. 20536

[redacted]

JUL 19 2001

File: [redacted] Office: SAN FRANCISCO, CA Date:

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

Application: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of $110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

Identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER, EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Acting Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, San Francisco, California, and a subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Associate Commissioner for Examinations. The matter is now before the Associate Commissioner on a motion to reopen. The motion will be granted and the order dismissing the appeal will be affirmed. The application will be denied.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than one year. The applicant is married to a lawful permanent resident of the United States and is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative. She seeks the above waiver in order to remain in the United States and reside with her spouse and children.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly. The Associate Commissioner affirmed that decision on appeal.

On motion, counsel states that the applicant relied upon her prior attorney to properly file the waiver request with supporting documentation. Prior counsel failed to submit documentation to establish extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse and the applicant was unaware that the information was needed. In support of the motion, counsel submits a declaration from the applicant's spouse and three letters of support.

The record reflects that the applicant was initially present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole in 1992. On April 7, 1998, she filed an application to adjust her status to that of a lawful permanent resident. On or after September 30, 1998, the applicant traveled to Mexico for the purpose of attending her sister's funeral and reentered the United States in parole status on October 11, 1998.

It should be noted that although the district director found the applicant ineligible for admission into the United States due to an unlawful presence of more than 180 days but less than one year, the record indicates that her unlawful presence in the United States was for a period of one year or more. She is therefore inadmissible from the United States under § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), not under § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), as noted in the district director's denial of the application.

Section 212(a) of the Act states:

> CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.- Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are

inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

* * *

(9) ALIENS PREVIOUSLY REMOVED.-

* * *

(B) ALIENS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT.-

(i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

(I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States (whether or not pursuant to § 244(e) [1254]) prior to the commencement of proceedings under § 235(b)(1) or § 240 [1229a], and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, is inadmissible.

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure from the United States, is inadmissible.

* * *

(v) WAIVER.-The Attorney General has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action by the Attorney General regarding a waiver under this clause.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act was amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). After reviewing the IIRIRA amendments to the Act relating to fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful presence in the United States, and after noting the increased penalties Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar in some instances, eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, and providing a ground of inadmissibility for unlawful presence after April 1, 1997, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful presence of aliens in the United States.

The Board has held that extreme hardship is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible meaning, and that the elements to establish extreme hardship are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. These factors should be viewed in light of the Board's statement that a restrictive view of extreme hardship is not mandated either by the Supreme Court or by its own case law. See Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413 (BIA 1996).

It is noted that the requirements to establish extreme hardship in the present waiver proceedings under § 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act do not include a showing of hardship to the alien as did former cases involving suspension of deportation. Present waiver proceedings require a showing of extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. This requirement is identical to the extreme hardship requirement stipulated in the amended fraud waiver proceedings under § 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(i).

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, Interim Decision 3380 (BIA 1999), the Board stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established "extreme hardship" in waiver proceedings under § 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; (2) the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; (3) the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; (4) the financial impact of departure from this country; (5) and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

On motion, the applicant's spouse states that he and the applicant have been married since 1991 and have three children. He states that he loves his wife very much, cannot imagine living without her, and believes he would be extremely depressed if she were to be removed from the United States. The applicant does not work outside

the home and is the primary caretaker of their children. The spouse states that he would be unable to work without his wife's presence. In addition, the spouse states that his children would be irreparably harmed if the applicant were removed from the United States.

In Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, fails to establish the existence of hardship to the applicant's spouse (the only qualifying relative) caused by separation that reaches the level of extreme as envisioned by Congress if the applicant is not allowed to remain in the United States. Hardship to the applicant's children is not a consideration in § 212(a)(9)(B)(v) proceedings. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Matter of T--S--Y--, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the order dismissing the appeal will be affirmed. The application will be denied.

ORDER: The Associate Commissioner's order of January 31, 2001 dismissing the appeal is affirmed. The application is denied.