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U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE
425 Eye Street N.W.
BCIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F
Washington, D.C. 20536

[REDACTED]

MAY 12 2003

FILE [REDACTED]

Office: Helena

Date:

IN RE: Applicant:

[REDACTED]

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under
Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

PUBLIC COPY

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Bureau) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Helena, Montana, and a subsequent appeal was dismissed by Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The matter is now before the AAO on a motion to reopen. The motion will be dismissed, and the order dismissing the appeal will be affirmed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole in May 1990. The applicant married a native and citizen of Mexico in August 1992, and she remained unlawfully present until November 12, 1998, when she filed an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. She was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 1 year, after she departed the United States in November 1999 and returned on January 31, 2000, in parole status. The applicant seeks a waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly. The AAO affirmed that decision on appeal.

On motion, counsel refers to the AAO's decision which indicated that there was no information concerning the asthmatic condition of the applicant's spouse in the record. Counsel submits a nearly illegible copy of an Emergency Department medical record relating to the applicant's spouse and his asthmatic condition. The date on that document is completely unreadable. An earlier copy contained in the record appears to read June 29, 1990, though the last digit is barely legible. Counsel also submits a medical note dated September 19, 2001, that indicates that the applicant's spouse was treated at the Valley Family Health Care Clinic on February 24, 2001, for asthma, and he is currently on medical treatment for asthma. There is no additional documentation relating to any follow-up treatment for that condition or prognosis regarding the seriousness of his asthma. In addition, there is no evidence that this condition could not be treated in Mexico.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(i) Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

(I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States, whether or not pursuant to section 244(e), prior to the commencement of proceedings under section 235(b)(1) or section 240, and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, or

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure from the United States, is inadmissible.

(v) The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action by the Attorney General regarding a waiver under this clause.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act was amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). After reviewing the IIRIRA amendments to the Act relating to fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful presence in the United States, and after noting the increased penalties Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar in some instances, eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, and providing a ground of inadmissibility for unlawful presence (entry without inspection) after April 1, 1997, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful presence of aliens in the United States.

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999), the Board stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established "extreme hardship" in waiver proceedings under section 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; (2) the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; (3) the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; (4) the financial impact of departure from this country; (5) and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

The Board noted in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* that the alien's wife knew that he was in deportation proceedings at the time they were married. The Board stated that this factor goes to the wife's expectations at the time they were wed. The alien's wife was aware that she may have to face the decision of parting from her husband or following him to Mexico in the event he was ordered deported. The alien's wife was also aware that a move to Mexico would

separate her from her family in the United States. The Board found this to undermine the alien's argument that his wife will suffer extreme hardship if he is deported. The Board then refers to *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), where the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.

The applicant in the present matter had been unlawfully present in the United States since 1990 and it must be presumed that her husband was aware of that when they married in August 1992.

It is noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in *Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam, supra*, need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. The applicant in the present matter entered the United States unlawfully in 1990 and married her spouse in 1992. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. However, as previously noted, a consideration of the Attorney General's discretion is applicable only after extreme hardship has been established.

The Board in *Cervantes-Gonzalez, supra*, also referred to *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 983 (1971), where the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

Although the applicant alleges financial hardship in this matter, the Board referred to *Shooshtary v. INS*, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994), in which the court stated that the "extreme hardship requirement of section 212(h)(2) of the Act was not enacted to insure that the family members of excludable aliens fulfill their dreams or continue in the lives which they currently enjoy."

There are no laws that require a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident who is not subject to being removed to leave the United States and live abroad. Further, the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, fails to establish the existence of hardship to the applicant's spouse (the only qualifying relative) caused by separation that reaches the level of extreme as envisioned by Congress if the applicant is not allowed to remain in the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the motion will be dismissed, and the order dismissing the appeal will be affirmed.

ORDER: The motion is dismissed. The order of June 13, 2002, dismissing the appeal is affirmed.