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U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

[redacted]

File: [redacted] Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: FEB 05 2003
(SRC 02 208 55318 relates)

IN RE: Petitioner: [redacted]
Beneficiary:

Petition: Petition for Alien Fiance(e) Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)

IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of $110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a naturalized citizen of the United States who seeks to classify the beneficiary, a native and citizen of Cameroon, as the fiance(e) of a United States citizen pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K).

The director denied the petition after determining that the petitioner and the beneficiary had not personally met within two years before the date of filing the petition, as required by section 214(d) of the Act. In reaching this conclusion, the director found that the petitioner's failure to comply with the statutory requirement was not the result of extreme hardship to the petitioner or unique circumstances.

Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K), defines "fiance(e)" as:

> An alien who is the fiancee or fiance of a citizen of the United States and who seeks to enter the United States solely to conclude a valid marriage with the petitioner within ninety days after entry....

Section 214(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d), states in pertinent part that a fiance(e) petition:

> shall be approved only after satisfactory evidence is submitted by the petitioner to establish that the parties **have previously met in person within two years before the date of filing the petition**, have a bona fide intention to marry, and are legally able and actually willing to conclude a valid marriage in the United States within a period of ninety days after the alien's arrival....[emphasis added]

The petitioner filed the Petition for Alien Fiance(e) (Form I-129F) on July 25, 2002. Therefore, the petitioner and the beneficiary were required to have met during the period that began on July 25, 2000 and ended on July 25, 2002.

In response to Question #19 on the Form I-129F, the petitioner indicated that he and the beneficiary had never met. In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted a letter explaining that he and the beneficiary began corresponding in February 2000 by exchanging photographs and talking on the telephone and that when he asked her to marry him in December 2000, she agreed.

On appeal, counsel submits a statement and documentation including letters from the beneficiary and her parents to the petitioner, evidence that the petitioner sent money via Western Union to the

beneficiary, and telephone billing statements showing communication between the petitioner and beneficiary. Counsel asserts that the families of both parties met and performed marriage ceremonies, exchanged customary gifts, and the groom's family received the bride on the petitioner's behalf. Counsel states that this is the traditional way marriages are done by the parties' ethnic groups when the bride and groom live miles apart. Counsel further asserts that the petitioner's employment restrictions and the major expenses involved in traveling to Cameroon created hardship for him.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), a director may exercise discretion and waive the requirement of a personal meeting between the two parties if it is established that compliance would:

(1) Result in extreme hardship to the petitioner; or

(2) Violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice.

The regulation at section 214.2(k)(2) does not define what may constitute extreme hardship to a petitioner. Therefore, each claim of extreme hardship must be judged on a case-by-case basis taking into account the totality of the petitioner's circumstances. Generally, a director looks at whether the petitioner can demonstrate the existence of circumstances that are (1) not within the power of the petitioner to control or change, and (2) likely to last for a considerable duration or the duration cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. Examples of such circumstances may include, but are not limited to, serious medical conditions or hazards to U.S. citizens to travel to certain countries.

In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that he warrants a favorable exercise of discretion to waive the requirement of a personal meeting with the beneficiary during the period that began on July 25, 2000 and ended on July 25, 2002. The information and documentation submitted does not establish that compliance with the in-person meeting requirement would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice. Furthermore, the time and expense required for the petitioner to travel to a foreign country are normal difficulties encountered in complying with the requirement and are not considered extreme hardship.

The petitioner has failed to establish that he and the beneficiary have personally met within the time period specified in section 214(d) of the Act, or that extreme hardship or unique circumstances exist to qualify him for a waiver of the statutory requirement. Therefore, the appeal will be dismissed.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the denial of the petition is without prejudice. Once the petitioner and the beneficiary have met, the petitioner may file a new I-129F petition in the

beneficiary's behalf so that the two-year period in which the parties are required to have met will apply. The petitioner will be required to submit evidence that he and the beneficiary have met within the two-year period that immediately precedes the filing of a new petition. Without the submission of documentary evidence that clearly establishes that the petitioner and the beneficiary have met in person during the requisite two-year period, the petition may not be approved unless the director grants a waiver of that requirement.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.